Thursday, August 25, 2005

Al Qaeda - Primary Enemy

Al Qaeda is a militant offshoot of the salafist school of supremacist Islam that is sponsored through wahhabist madrassas and immans. Invoking unstoppable "Perfect Storm" and incurable "Cancer" analogies overstates the invincibility of the Al Qaeda threat. And the notion that it is in alliance with our political foes on the left just like the old school Commies, tries to almost normalise it as a part of the everyday world . It is neither unstoppable or normal.

Al Qaeda grows as the militant subset of those schooled in salafism. Salafism is branch of Islam that bestows superiority on its believers over all others. It is a supremacist branch of Islam and requires strict adherance to a set of practices. Normally its followers are few as the rules of the sect make it difficult to follow and very difficult to make money in its practice. So in normal practice it would be a destitute religion.

Unfortunately one sect of salafism is wahhabism, this is the state religion of Saudi Arabia. Due to an abundance of oil the Sauds have no need to be nice to other people to make money, they can and do enforce the practice of wahhabist salafism. They also fund free schools in wahhabism worldwide and send out immans to preach wannabism worldwide. So there are many more salafists than ever before and with more salafists we get more militant salafists. And these militant salafists have money enough to mount an inetrnational campaign.

Al Qaeda is a root and branch affair - wahhabist root, salafist trunk and Al Qaeda branch. If the world ever wants to get rid of Al Qaeda all it needs to do is get rid of the Saudi wahhabist root and watch the tree wither and die.


Why do the Sauds spread this salafism?

Wahhabism as a religion teaches respect and comraderie (umma) between the wahhabist rulers and their wahhabist subjects. It extolls the virtue of correct wahhabist practice above all else and denigrates all other beliefs. The comradeship allows the Sauds to misrule Arabia as comrades of the people and the denigration makes it possible to direct rebellion against outsiders and not the regime. Al Qaeda when it operates in the Kingdom is not a classic rebellion, it does not target any of the princes or any of the vital oil infrastructure by which the princes rule - rather Al Qaeda attacks foreign workers.

The Sauds also benefit by Al Qaeda caused instability driving up the price of oil. (Hat Tip: wretchard & doug at Belmont Club.)


Why does the world let them?

The world does not, the House of Saud is protected by the USA and the UK alone. Probably for oil - as oil is very, very, very important. They can of course, openly justify protection for the Sauds by ties of honour and friendship dating back to the WW2 and the Cold War.

And there are other enemies.


This is my interpretation of the Al Qaeda phenomena. It was born out of a reply I posted in the Belmont Club .

Saturday, August 13, 2005

Winning Iraq - Mark I

This is going to be an ongoing thing and any modifications will be gladly accepted.

Lessons learned from the loss in South East Asia and the win in Central America - the enemy needs to be isolated from funding and support and then the enemy needs to be forced to give up.

The Easy Problem

The enemy in Iraq consists mainly of the Sunni tribes of Iraq. Their loyalty is tribal and if they can gain a good deal for their tribe they can be placated through the political process. This political process needs alot of attention.

In addition to the Sunni tribes there are also Kurdish and Shia tribes. These have benefited so far from the presence of American and allied trrops. These groups have been forming the new Iraqi security forces and as such constitute a real threat to the Sunni tribes. These growing non-Sunni Iraqi security forces are a way to pressurise the Sunni towards a deal.

The tribes are a solvable problem because they can be convinced with threats and concessions that can be made effective on the tribe. Screw ups like the debaathification process have made it more difficult, but the tribes are in the process of bargaining for a future within Iraq.

The Harder Problem

The Baathists were the empowered senior Sunni from the old regime. They were dumped on by the Americans at the start of the occupation (blanket deBaathification) and have probably accounted for 70% of the American casualties in response. They are getting support from the Syrian Baathist state and form the most effective anti-occupation forces in country. However they are all local tribal people and as long as the political negotiations continue they could well be accomodated.

The Big As Insolvable Under the Current Strategy Problem

The global jihad for a caliphate (al Qaeda, Muslim Brotherhood, et al.) is in Iraq, it is also active in Europe, SE Asia, Africa, southern Russia and probably America. Iraq is the hottest, most visible part of the jihad. The jihad has a strong root in the fundamentalist wahhabist sect of Islam, this teaches that the Islam is about purity of actions and beliefs (Sunni Islamic supremacists). This sect is the state supported religion of Saudi Arabia and is strongly followed in Yemen. The House of Saud has spent billions providing free schooling in wahhabism (also reading & writing) throughout the Muslim world. The House of Saud has spent billions as grants to immams through out the world to preach this purity of Islam. The House of Saud has spent billions providing charitable care and welfare to the sick and needy throughout the Muslim world. Wahhabism's teachings are quite well known and many Muslims of fighting age are sympathetic to it's message.

The jihad was not tolerated under Saddam and has had to establish itself in Iraq during the occupation. The jihad has become more effective as time has passed, they have an almost endless supply of recruits which they are now bringing to bear on the Iraqi conflict. As supremacists they are enemies of everyone who is not Sunni, this means 80% of Iraq are targets to them.

They have worked with the local Baathists, worked with the Sunni tribes, but they are not part of the tribes. No pressure applied to the tribes, no carrot offered to the tribes will stop the jihad. They are motivated in the belief that they are acting in Gods will, their motivation cannot be destroyed (IMHO).

The only effective way to hurt jihad will be to hurt members of the wahhabist sect. This would reduce the funding for the hospitals, schools and mosques that promote jihad.

The hardest way to do this would be to introduce democracy across the Middle East (the Bush plan). Democracy is not acceptable to the practice of wahhabism. Wahhabism preaches loyalty to/umma with the leaders of the people, democratic societies view their leaders as an unfortunate neccessity and not to be trusted. A democratic Middle East would leave the Arabs to rule themselves, which they may even like. Unfortunately wahhabism is quite popular and it could well win any election.

The easier way would to enforce leaders on the wahhabist countries who are not sympathetic to wahhabism. A secular military dictatorship might work, a modernising king with a distrust for the clergy or whatever is available. A dictator such as this would need to purge out any unsympathetic elements within the clergy, 10,000 or so dead would be a likely result. But once the purging is done wahhabism and its followers would have to endure as the pure sons of Islam without billions of dollars of discretionary spending.

Even though it is the harder and more risky thing to do I think democracy would be a better plan, more stable in the long term. But if a dictator could be found to hold the reins for 50 years (until the oil runs out)...perhaps this new king will be useful or perhaps the next one or the next one after that.

Tuesday, August 09, 2005

Success - the greatest American victory since WW2

The Nicaraguan War is an important conflict and the only major win for the USA since beating Japan.

The Nicaraguan war was a guerilla conflict. It was fought through massacres and bombings and land clearances and collective punishment. It was a war fought between the USSR and the USA by way of local proxys. Firstly the Somoza regime v. Sandinista rebels, then the Somoza regime was overthrown and the war became Sandinista regime vs Contra rebels. At the end of the war a democracy was established and pro-American government was installed. There was no good, ethical, morally virtuous side. This is a good summary of the conflict.

Why did the Americans win?

Because the war ended in 1990 as the Soviet Union collapsed. The Soviets stopped funding the Sandinistas. At the point where they lost the Sandinistas were in control of almost all of the territory and had a significant numerical superiority. However they were forced to gamble on an election victory because they needed a popular mandate, until 1989 they could rely on funding from USSR/Cuba and the support (or otherwise) of the Nicuraguan people was irrelevant. Unsurprisingly in the election the cash strapped communist regime that had ridden the country into the ground, failed to beat an opposition supported with some of the best electioneering talent money can buy.

The American victory was due to its willingness to spend for longer than the Soviet Union.


Iraq - America is again engaged in a guerilla war against an ideologically opposed force.

Good news - the government of Iraq is allied to America, holds almost all of the territory and has numerical superiority.

Bad news - the enemy will never agree to elections; the enemy has funding largely derived from oil revenue expected to cease in 2060 - 2070; the enemy does not confine the war to Iraq; America tries to confine the war to Iraq.

Summary - if America maintains the current strategy it can expect victory in 2060 or so.

Wednesday, August 03, 2005

Iraq is Vietnam lite

Being popular and right does not win wars. Wars are fought to enforce the rule of the victor on the conquered.

Today there is significant opposition to the rule of the communists in Vietnam. At the time of the Vietnam War, there may have been large pockets of resentment in N. Vietnam (people who are sacrificing millions of their children to feed the ambitions of a dictator may have welcomed a change in leadership). In S. Vietnam there certainly was a lot of distrust of Ho Chi Minh, especially after the Hue massacres.

However all resentment in N. Vietnam was made null and void, because the America high command (Presidents plural) chose not to let S. Vietnam liberate this resentment. N. Vietnam never had enough men and material to enforce its will on S. Vietnam whilst the Americans were there. S. Vietnam was never allowed to attempt to impose its will on N. Vietnam whilst the Americans were there. When eventually the Americans left and the real war started, S. Vietnam had been so degraded and fought over and depleted that it lost the War with the North.

Similar applies in Iraq their is a will for democracy and capitalism throughout the Artab world, Iraq is an Arab and partially Sunni country. Sunni Arab fundamentalists who form the basis of the insurgency in Iraq view it as part of their greater caliphate. America constraints its conduct so that it does not upset certain of its Sunni Arab allies in prosecuting the war against the fundamentalists. It is from these same Sunni Arab countries that men and material flow, the flow is small and will not defeat Iraq whilst America stays, but when America leaves (next Democrat President or even next Republican President) it will fall upon Iraq to defend itself at the same time as fending off an internal Sunni vs. Shia vs. Kurd vs. Turkman civil war. This is a legacy America does not need to leave to the Iraqis as it within America’s power to stop this flow, but that will mean threatening longtime allies.

In Vietnam the commander of American focres had good reason (not wanting Soviet involvement and possible WW3 is a good enough reason) not to let the S. Vietnamese prosecute the war past the 17th parallel. In Iraq there is no good reason not to threaten longtime allies enough that they will stop the flow of support to the fundamentalists.